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INDICTING AND CONVICTING PHYSICIANS FOR
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DISTRIBUTION IN THE
AGE OF THE OPIOID CRISIS
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ABSTRACT
In response to the devastating impact of the opioid crisis, the Department of Justice
has in recent years launched an aggressive crackdown on what it characterizes as
“fraudulent prescribers” of controlled substances. Against this backdrop,
physicians, prosecutors, and defense attorneys face a number of issues.
First, there is a lingering circuit court split on the issue of whether indictments
against physicians and other medical professionals for illegal controlled substance
distribution must allege that the physician acted “outside the usual course of
professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose.” I argue that acting
without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of narcotics distribution that
must be alleged in indictments for both constitutional and policy reasons.
Next, there is ambiguity as to what type of conduct is considered to have no
legitimate medical purpose, and the line between poor medical practice and criminal
conduct is ill-defined. I argue that the statutory scheme for prosecuting physicians
is vague and ineffective at providing guidance to doctors, juries, judges, and
attorneys.
Finally, there is the broader question of whether physicians should be the target of
limited prosecutorial funds, or whether the government should instead focus on the
pharmaceutical companies whose actions lie at the heart of the opioid crisis. This
comment explores the legal options for holding drug companies accountable for
their role in the crisis, and argues that these options are more effective than
prosecutions of individual physicians.

INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions2 announced “the

2

On November 7, 2018, Jeff Sessions was forced to resign at the request of President Donald
Trump. His post was briefly filled by then-Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker, a former
federal prosecutor who touted the administration’s “law and order” approach to combating the
opioid crisis. See Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump
Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/QST3XJRX]; see also Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker Delivers Remarks to State and Local
Law Enforcement on Efforts to Combat Violent Crime and the Opioid Crisis, Des Moines, IA
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-attorney-general-matthew-whitakerdelivers-remarks-state-and-local-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/87CU-ZCJK]. On February
14, 2019, the Senate confirmed William Barr as Attorney General. David Shortell, William Barr
Confirmed as Attorney General, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019), https://wwwm.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/william-barr-senate-confirmationvote/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F [https://perma.cc/994G-C9UA].
Barr is specially connected to a tough-on-crime approach to drugs—he served as Attorney
General during the height of the George H.W. Bush administration’s war on drugs (which
incarcerated a disproportionate amount of minorities on drug charges), and his daughter, Mary
Daly, is the Trump administration’s Director of Opioid Enforcement and Prevention Efforts.
Colby Itkowitz, Trump’s New Top AG Pick Would Be His Daughter’s Boss at Justice, WASH.
POST (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/06/william-barr-sharessame-hard-line-views-drug-enforcement-his-daughter-who-already-works-justicedepartment/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f5a679132cb8 [https://perma.cc/SF3Y-ZLX6]. Daly and
her father appear to share similar law-and-order approaches to tackling America’s drug problem.
Id.
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largest health care fraud takedown operation in American history.” 3 As part of this
takedown, the Department of Justice charged “162 people—including 32 doctors—
with the illegal distribution of opioids.”4 Attorney General Sessions noted that the
“ongoing opioid crisis . . . is the deadliest drug epidemic in American history,”5 and
lamented that “[s]ome of our most trusted medical professionals look at their
patients—vulnerable people suffering from addiction—and they see dollar signs.”6
Attorney General Sessions’s remarks reflect the Trump administration’s
hardline law-enforcement approach to combating the opioid crisis. A statement on
The White House website details the administration’s “aggressive and multifaceted
response to opioid addiction:” “[t]he Administration is bringing its tough law-andorder approach to the drug trade” by, among other things, “cracking down on
fraudulent prescribers.”7 This approach to the opioid crisis includes assigning
twelve Assistant United States Attorneys to investigate opioid-related healthcare
fraud in “opioid ‘hot-spots,’” creating a Medicare Fraud Strike Force to charge
people, including doctors, with prescribing and distributing opioids, and “initiat[ing]
a surge to focus on pharmacies and prescribers who are dispensing unusual or
disproportionate amounts of drugs, intensifying the fight against prescription drug
diversion.”8
Statistics confirm Attorney General Sessions’s assertion that the opioid crisis
has had a deadly and devastating effect on American lives. Opioids kill more than
115 people every day in America.9 In 2017, there were over 72,000 deaths related
to drug overdoses in the United States, two-thirds of which involved opioids.10
Drugs caused more American deaths in 2017 than guns, car crashes, or HIV/AIDS
have ever caused in a single year.11 Americans, particularly those in the rural areas
that have been hit hardest by the opioid epidemic, have been forced to confront this
widespread problem, often when tragic overdoses mar their own communities and
families. An October 2018 poll found that rural Americans see opioid addiction as
3

Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks Announcing National Health Care Fraud and
Opioid Takedown, Washington, D.C. (June 28, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcingnational-health-care-fraud-and [https://perma.cc/K8QM-4TCQ] [hereinafter Attorney General
Sessions Remarks].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
How We Will Win the War on Opioids, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/will-win-war-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/2TB5-5H37] (last
visited November 28, 2018).
8
Id.
9
Opioid Overdose Crisis, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis#one
[https://perma.cc/TZF8-FFJJ] (last updated Jan. 2019).
10
German Lopez, 2017 Was the Worst Year Ever for Drug Overdose Deaths in America, VOX
(Aug. 16, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/16/17698204/opioidepidemic-overdose-deaths-2017 [https://perma.cc/HA7R-WGW5] (citing Provisional Drug
Overdose Death Counts, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm [https://perma.cc/Q8S2-3UV4] (last
visited Nov. 28, 2018)).
11
Id.
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one of the biggest problems their communities face, matched only by their fears
about the lagging rural economy. 12 In the same poll, well over half of young rural
Americans said they knew someone who has struggled with opioid addiction.13
While nearly everyone agrees that opioid addiction is a critical problem facing
the country today, there appears to be a disconnect between the origins of the opioid
crisis and the government’s approach to solving it. Some argue that “[w]hile
prosecutions do not necessarily reduce the number of Americans addicted to opioids,
‘these cases are important because they push more people to seek treatment.’” 14 Yet
even the federal government acknowledges that the opioid crisis did not originate
with doctors, but rather with “pharmaceutical companies,” who “reassured the
medical community that patients would not become addicted to prescription opioid
pain relievers.”15 “[H]ealthcare providers began to prescribe them at greater rates,”
which “subsequently led to widespread diversion and misuse of these medications
before it became clear that these medications could indeed be highly addictive.” 16
The National Institute on Drug Abuse points to a number of factors that acted in
concert to cause the opioid crisis: “a healthcare system that sought to minimize pain
and suffering” and which taught physicians that their patients would not become
addicted to pain medication; “a massive flood of heroin in the 2000s from Mexico;”
and the lacing of heroin with powerful and deadly synthetic opioids.17 America
became all the more susceptible to opioids with “the gradual decline of economic
power in parts of the country that were once the lifeblood of the economy.” 18
Meanwhile, there are estimated to be over twenty-five million Americans
suffering from chronic pain in America, many of whom, for better or worse, have
been led by the healthcare system to rely on opioids to provide needed pain relief. 19
However, as opioid addiction reaches crisis levels, people suffering from chronic
pain have reported being rapidly tapered off of opioids or turned away altogether by
doctors who fear prosecution for inappropriate prescribing. 20 In the words of one
Oregon doctor: “I will not treat chronic pain. Period . . . [t]here is too much risk
involved.”21 With doctors fearful of treating patients who depend on opioids, many
12

Joe Neel & Alison Kodjak, NPR Poll: Rural Americans Are Worried About Addiction and Jobs,
But Remain Optimistic, NPR (Oct. 16, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/10/16/656900971/npr-poll-rural-americans-are-worried-about-addiction-and-jobs-butremain-optimis [https://perma.cc/QT7Y-XHP4].
13
Id.
14
Kate Benner, Snaring Doctors and Drug Dealers, Justice Dept. Intensifies Opioid Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/us/politics/opioids-crackdownsessions.html [https://perma.cc/R2SS-Y56N].
15
Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 9.
16
Id.
17
Krishnadev Calamur, An ‘Overprescription of Opioids’ That Led to a Crisis, THE ATLANTIC
(June 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/06/opioid-epidemic/563576/
[https://perma.cc/Z446-SUJF].
18
Id.
19
Brianna Ehley, How the Opioid Crackdown is Backfiring, POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/28/how-the-opioid-crackdown-is-backfiring-752183
[https://perma.cc/LTN7-KT5W].
20
Id.
21
Id.
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patients have turned to street drugs to ease their pain–some even contemplating
suicide.22 One patient, suffering from both the lingering, excruciating pain of a
decades-old motorcycle crash as well as opioid-withdrawal symptoms, created a plan
to kill himself when his doctor would no longer prescribe opioids, stating that “[his]
pain exceeded [his] ability to handle it.” 23
Against this complicated backdrop, there are a number of issues that add to the
uncertainty doctors face when contemplating their potential criminal liability for
prescribing opioids. First, there is a lingering circuit court split in a small but crucial
aspect of prosecuting doctors for drug distribution. Circuit courts are divided on the
issue of whether indictments against medical professionals for illegal controlled
substance distribution must allege that the medical professional acted outside the
usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose (or
some variation on that language). Some courts view acting without a legitimate
medical purpose as an essential element of the crime that must be alleged in an
indictment in order to comply with the standards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
while others believe that acting for a legitimate medical purpose is an exception to
the general prohibition on controlled substance distribution that does not need to be
negated in an indictment.
Next, there is great ambiguity as to what type of conduct is considered outside
the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose.
Doctors have little guidance on the line between adequate care for their patients’
individual health needs and criminal liability for unlawful drug distribution. While
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention has released guidelines for prescribing
opioids for chronic pain, these guidelines have been criticized by physicians’ groups,
including the American Medical Association.24 The element of acting without a
legitimate medical purpose is a question of fact that is left to the jury, which is often
provided only a vague and circular sense of the element’s meaning and its
distinctions from the more widely understood idea of medical malpractice.25 Critics
have accused the government of “us[ing] legal ambiguity for tactical advantage” and
have warned that the government “will not readily clarify lines it expects doctors to
follow at their peril.”26
Part I of this Comment explores the constitutional right to an indictment by a
grand jury in felony cases, and the requirement that those indictments allege each
element of the charged crime. Next, it examines the statutory framework for illegal
controlled substance distribution. It then lays out the viewpoints of the various
22

Id.
Id.
24
What Physicians Are Saying About the New CDC Opioid Guidelines, AMA WIRE (Mar. 16,
2016), https://wire.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/what-physicians-are-saying-about-new-cdcopioid-guidelines [https://perma.cc/GV24-3QUQ].
25
See, e.g., United States v. Volkman, 979 F.3d 377, 388 (6th Cir. 2015) (“This case is not about
whether the defendant acted negligently or whether he committed malpractice. Rather, in order for
you to find the defendant guilty, you must find that the government has proved to you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s action was not for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual
course of professional practice.”).
26
Harvey Silverglate, When Treating Pain Brings a Criminal Indictment, THE WALL STREET J.
(June 12, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-treating-pain-brings-a-criminal-indictment1434148923 [https://perma.cc/U66Y-GFLS].
23
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circuits that have weighed in on the issue: first looking to those that have held that
acting without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of the crime that must be
charged in an indictment against a doctor, and then to those that have held that acting
with a legitimate medical purpose is an exception that the government does not need
to allege in an indictment. It next examines petitions for writs of certiorari on this
issue. Finally, Part I argues that indictments against doctors must in fact allege that
medical professionals accused of controlled substance distribution acted outside the
usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose, for
both constitutional and policy reasons.
Part II explores the substance of the “without a legitimate medical purpose”
element. It first looks to how the element has been defined, the wide latitude given
to juries in deciding this issue, and the broad range of conduct that has fallen into
this nebulous element. It explores the criticism levied towards this element for being
impossibly vague, difficult to clarify, and ineffective at providing guidance to
doctors, juries, judges, and attorneys as to when conduct crosses the line into
criminality. This Part looks particularly at the element’s effect on elderly and rural
physicians, before offering some solutions to the problems with defining this
element.
Finally, Part III addresses alternative means of addressing the opioid crisis. It
first explores the origins of the opioid crisis, namely, the pharmaceutical companies
who encouraged doctors to prescribe opioids despite knowledge of the substantial
risks these drugs entail, and the distributors who funneled these drugs into American
homes despite knowing about their strong potential for misuse. Then, it looks to the
various strategies that have been put into place to hold these companies accountable.
Finally, it argues that these options are more effective than prosecutions of individual
physicians.
I. ISSUES WITH INDICTMENTS OF DOCTORS FOR CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE DISTRIBUTION
A. Background
On April 12, 2018, seventy-one-year-old Dr. Joseph Olivieri was arrested in the
Southern District of New York and charged with one conspiracy count and three
substantive counts of controlled substance distribution. 27 Federal prosecutors
alleged that Dr. Olivieri had improperly prescribed testosterone to an undercover
N.Y.P.D. agent who, according to the agent, had normal testosterone and simply told
Dr. Olivieri he wanted to have larger muscles.28 On the day of his arrest, Dr. Olivieri
appeared before a federal magistrate judge, who released the doctor on a number of
bail conditions, including a condition that he could not prescribe any medicines or
pharmaceuticals.29 That condition was subsequently modified to prevent Dr. Olivieri

27

See Criminal Docket for Case 1:18-cr-00316-PAC, United States v. Olivieri (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Complaint at 5, United States v. Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018), ECF
No. 1; Letter from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC
(S.D.N.Y.) (May 14, 2018), ECF No. 19.
29
See Bail Disposition, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2018), ECF No.5.
28
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only from prescribing “controlled substances,” 30 however, the damage to Dr.
Olivieri’s practice was already done.
Dr. Olivieri had specialized in treating predominantly gay men diagnosed with
HIV and AIDs since the 1980s.31 Many of these men had grown to rely on him to
refill their needed prescriptions. 32 However, as a result of the criminal charges
against him, Dr. Olivieri was quickly suspended by his employer, leaving him with
little income or future job prospects while his patients scrambled to fill their needed
prescriptions.33 As a result of the “dire financial straits” the loss of his employment
put him in, the physician was forced to sell his New York home. 34
This chain of events, which left an elderly doctor who had devoted his career to
treating HIV/AIDs victims without a home or job, all occurred after an indictment
which failed to accuse the physician of prescribing without a legitimate medical
purpose, and prior to any finding or plea of guilt. 35 While it is clear from the
Complaint filed on April 9, 2018 that the United States Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York believed that Dr. Olivieri had improperly prescribed
testosterone to an undercover NYPD officer, the indictment endorsed by the grand
jury made no mention of the fact that Dr. Olivieri was a physician, or that he was
authorized by the Attorney General to prescribe controlled substances. 36 Dr.
Olivieri’s indictment alleged only that he “intentionally and knowingly distributed,
dispensed, and possessed with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation
of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).”37 In other words, Dr. Olivieri
was indicted, arrested, forbidden from prescribing controlled substances, and
subsequently suspended from his job treating HIV-positive men based on an
indictment that alleged only that he intentionally prescribed controlled substances—
an act that Dr. Olivieri was authorized to perform and which millions of physicians
perform every day in order to supply their patients with needed medications. 38
30

See Endorsed Letter as to Joseph Olivieri addressed to Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang from
Julia Gatto, Esq. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang on 4/18/2018), Olivieri, 1:18-cr00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2018), ECF No. 12.
31
Letter from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, supra note 28.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Letter from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 10, 2018), ECF No. 53.
35
See Indictment of Joseph Olivieri, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018), ECF
No. 13. The physician was re-indicted on August 23, 2018 in a superseding indictment that
included the previously omitted element. Superseding Indictment at 2, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316PAC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018), ECF No. 41.
36
See Indictment of Joseph Olivieri, supra note 35; Complaint, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1.
37
Indictment of Joseph Olivieri at 2, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018), ECF
No. 13.
38
In the Superseding Indictment filed on August 23, 2018, Dr. Olivieri was charged with
substantive and conspiracy counts of prescribing additional controlled substances, including
opioids. Superseding Indictment at 1-8, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018),
ECF No. 41. He pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled
substances on May 2, 2019. Transcript of Proceedings as to Joseph Olivieri re: Plea held on
5/2/19 before Judge Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019), ECF
No. 77. His sentencing has been postponed pending a number of serious health issues. See Letter
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1. The Right to an Indictment by a Grand Jury
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “[n]o
person shall be held to answer for a[n] . . . infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury.”39 Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment requires that
“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation.”40 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments together
stand for the “substantial right” of a defendant accused of a felony “to be tried only
on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury,” 41 so as to protect
defendants from being “convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not
even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him. 42 Indictments meet this
constitutional standard by “contain[ing] every element of the offense intended to be
charged.”43 Indictment by a grand jury “serves the ‘dual function of determining if
probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting
citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.’”44 The Supreme Court described
the grand jury as “a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen
and an overzealous prosecutor.”45
Federal grand jury pools, like federal trial jury pools, are made up of U.S.
citizens over the age of eighteen living within the federal district court’s geographical
region.46 These potential jurors are then screened to ensure they speak English, are
mentally and physically competent, and have never been convicted of a felony. 47 A
federal grand jury is charged with making the ultimate determination that there is
probable cause that a crime has been committed, and prosecutors can subpoena
witnesses and documents to provide the grand jury with evidence of a crime.48 While
in practice there is a common belief that grand juries are so influenced by prosecutors
that “you can get a grand jury to ‘indict a ham sandwich,’” the federal grand jury still
retains the constitutionally-granted ability to make the ultimate decision as to
whether or not to indict an individual who is under investigation for a federal

from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2019), ECF No. 105.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Grand Jury Clause applies to any crime punishable by death or
more than one year of imprisonment. See, e.g. United States v. Coachman, 752 F.2d 685, 689 n.24
(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a)(1).
40
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (emphasis added).
42
43

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962).

Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895).

Tony Onorato & Tymour Okasha, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: II. Preliminary Proceedings: Grand
Jury, 88 GEO. L.J. 1078, 1078–79 (2000).

44

45

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
Peter A. Joy, The Grand Jury’s Role in American Criminal Justice, Explained, THE
CONVERSATION (Aug. 7, 2017), https://theconversation.com/the-grand-jurys-role-in-americancriminal-justice-explained-82197 [https://perma.cc/J2N2-9UNQ].
47
Id.
48
Id.
46
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felony.49
2. The Statutory Scheme for Drug Distribution
Street heroin dealers, physicians struggling to walk the line between adequate
treatment and over-prescription of federally controlled substances,50 and pill-mills
churning out thousands of illicit opioid prescriptions can all be charged under the
same federal statute. 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1) states that “[e]xcept as authorized
by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . .
. to manufacture, distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 51 However, 21 U.S.C. section 822(b)
empowers the Attorney General to create a registration system for medical
professionals who, once registered, are authorized to distribute controlled
substances.52 The Attorney General regulates these medical professionals via 21
C.F.R section 1306.04, which notes that controlled substances may only be
prescribed “for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in
the usual course of his professional practice.”53 In United States v. Moore, the
governing Supreme Court case regarding the prosecution of physicians under section
841, the Court made it clear that “registered physicians can be prosecuted under
section 841 when their activities fall outside the usual course of professional
practice,”54 despite the fact that “[a] strict reading of [the statutory scheme] would
authorize a physician to prescribe drugs freely and without medical reason so long
as the physician is registered with the Attorney General.” 55 Finally, 21 U.S.C.
section 885(a)(1) states that “[i]t shall not be necessary for the United States to
negative any exemption or exception set forth in this subchapter in any . . . indictment
. . . and the burden of going forward with the evidence with respect to any such
exemption or exception shall be upon the person claiming its benefit.” 56
3. The Circuit Court Split
Circuit courts are split as to the essential elements of controlled substance
distribution under section 841(a)(1) when the defendant is a medical professional
registered with the Attorney General. 57 The issue dividing the circuit courts is
whether, for defendant-physicians, distribution outside the usual course of
49

Ben Zimmer, ‘Indict a Ham Sandwich’ Remains on the Menu for Judges, Prosecutors, WALL
ST. J. (June 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indict-a-ham-sandwich-remains-on-the-menufor-judges-prosecutors-1527863063 [https://perma.cc/8Y6M-CVW4]; Joy, supra note 46.
50
21 C.F.R. § 1308 (2018). Federally controlled substances include opioids as well as many

non-opioid medications, such as the testosterone prescribed by Dr. Olivieri. See id.

51

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 822(b).
53
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04.
54
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975).
55
United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981).
56
21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1).
57
See United States v. Quinones, 536 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 n.1 (E.D.N.Y 2008); see also Leonard
B. Sand et al., 3 Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction 56.02 (noting that “there is a split
in the circuits as to whether the government must allege that the defendant dispensed the drugs
other than for a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of medical practice”).
52
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professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of the
crime that must be set forth in the indictment, or whether a registered physician
operating within the usual course of professional practice is an exception that, per
section 885(a)(1), the government is not required to “negative” in an indictment. 58
B. Circuits Holding that Acting Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose is an
Element
1. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Outler, the Fifth Circuit directly and expansively addressed
the issue of whether acting without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of
drug distribution by physicians or an exception.59 The physician in that matter
prescribed controlled substances to undercover agents after performing minimal
physical examinations and after the agents stated that the drugs would be used
recreationally and sold to others.60 The indictment against the physician contained
fifteen “virtually identical” counts which each used language similar to count one:
That on or about October 12, 1979, in the Macon Division of the Middle District of
Georgia, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, James E. Outler did unlawfully
and intentionally distribute, dispense, and caused to be distributed and dispensed, a
quantity of benzphetamine in the form of Didrex tablets, a Schedule III drug, by
means of a prescription to Rita Bragg, in violation of 21 United States Code, Section
841(a).61

At trial, the jury instructions included the element of prescribing without a
legitimate medical purpose and the prosecution introduced evidence to sufficiently
prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Fifth Circuit held that
“the lack of a legitimate medical reason is an essential element of [a physician
prescribing drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)], and therefore must be
alleged in the indictment.”62
The court concluded that the lack of a legitimate medical reason was an element
that “embodie[d] the culpability of the offense” because “[w]ithout behavior beyond
professional practice, there is no crime.” 63 While the court acknowledged the
government’s argument that the statutory construction of the Controlled Substances
Act seems to treat the presence of a legitimate medical purpose as an exception to
the general prohibition from distributing controlled substances, it went on to note
that, despite the general rule that statutory exceptions need not be alleged in an
indictment, “in rare instances, an exception can be so necessary to a true definition
58

Quinones, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 270, n.1.
Outler was decided by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit during the transitional period that
occurred while dividing the former Fifth Circuit into the new Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit has since overruled Outler, see United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d
1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (discussed infra), but Outler remains binding precedent in the
Fifth Circuit.
60
Outler, 659 F.2d at 1308.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1309.
63
Id.
59
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of the offense that the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the
exception. . . . We believe this to be the case whenever a physician is charged with
prescribing drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).”64 Otherwise, the court noted,
a grand jury properly could return an indictment against any doctor for prescribing
a controlled drug, and the doctor always would have the burden at trial of proving
the prescription was based on a legitimate medical need. The effect of this scheme
would be a presumption that every physician who prescribes a drug does so without
a legitimate medical reason. We do not believe Congress intended this result.65

The court finally noted that the requirement that a grand jury indictment must
allege each element of an offense protects both the Sixth Amendment right of a
defendant to be informed of the nature of the charges against him, and the Fifth
Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury in serious crimes.66 Even where
a physician is actually aware of the fact that he is alleged to have acted without a
legitimate medical purpose, as he almost certainly will be when he is being charged
with controlled substance distribution, “[t]o allow . . . a subsequent guess as to what
was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would
deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guarantee of the intervention
of a grand jury was designed to secure.”67
2. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. King, a defendant physician charged with distributing
cocaine was similarly charged with conspiracy and substantive counts of controlled
substance distribution by an indictment that failed to allege that he was a practitioner
distributing narcotics without a legitimate medical purpose. 68 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that “lack of authorization to distribute or dispense controlled substances
is an element of the crime,” which must be charged in the indictment, and found the
indictment against the defendant lacking because even “[t]he most liberal reading of
the indictment does not reflect an allegation that [the defendant] acted outside the
scope of the medical exception.”69 The court relied on its holding in United States
v. Black,70 where it noted that “[i]t is not ‘more likely than not’ that medical
practitioners registered to dispense controlled substances do so illegitimately and are
guilty of a criminal act; common experience . . . dictates precisely the opposite
conclusion.”71
64

Id. at 1309-1310, 1309 n.3.
Id. at 1309 n.3.
66
Id. at 1310.
67
Id. at 1311 (quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962)).
68
United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978).
69
Id.
70
United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1975).
71
It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit has deemed an indictment acceptable when it did not
explicitly allege absence of authorization, but did allege that a pharmacist possessed
pseudoephedrine that he knew and had reasonable cause to believe would be used to make
methamphetamine, reasoning that the indictment sufficiently informed the defendant that he was
charged with criminal conduct not covered by the exception for legitimate medical use. United
States v. Jae Gab Kim, 298 F.3d 746, 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002).
65
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3. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have reached less expansive conclusions, and
they have not spoken directly to the issue of what elements must be alleged in an
indictment. However, both have held that when a physician is charged with
controlled substance distribution in violation of §841(a), the government must prove:
“(1) that the defendant distributed or dispensed a controlled substance; (2) that the
defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; and (3) that the defendant’s actions
were not for legitimate medical purposes in the usual course of his professional
medical practice or were beyond the bounds of medical practice.” 72
C. Circuits Holding that Acting Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose is an
Exception that Need Not be Alleged in an Indictment
1. The Eleventh Circuit
In United States v. Steele, a pharmacist was indicted for dispensing controlled
substances in violation of section 841(a).73 The indictment charged four separate
counts, all of which were identical except for the controlled substances named in
them. Count one read:
That from on or about July 1, 1993, and continuously thereafter, up to and including
on or about November 2, 1993, in the Northern District of Florida, the defendant,
William O. Steele, did knowingly and intentionally dispense hydromorphone
hydrochloride, a schedule II controlled substance, commonly known as Dilaudid, in
violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).74

The Eleventh Circuit, in perhaps the most firm ruling of all the circuit courts
on this side of the issue, held that “an indictment of a practitioner for unlawfully
dispensing drugs need not aver that it was done outside the course of professional
practice.”75 The court looked specifically to section 855(a)(1), and, based on the
provision’s “explicit and unambiguous” language, held that it meant that “an
indictment charging a violation of § 841(a) need not negate the course of professional
practice exception.”76 While the court noted the defendant’s point that “Congress
could not have meant what it said in § 885(a)(1), because that would mean
prosecutors could indict each and every pharmacist and doctor in the country for
simply carrying out their professional duties,” the court wrote that they “seriously
doubt that the Department of Justice would tolerate the continued employment of
any prosecutor” who would indict such cases. 77 “Busy government prosecutors”
72

United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see
also United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that the government
must prove “(1) That defendant distributed a controlled substance; (2) That he acted intentionally
or knowingly; and (3) That defendant prescribed the drug without a legitimate medical purpose
outside the usual course of professional practice.”).
73
United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 1998).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1318-19.
77
Id. at 1319.
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would not want to indict cases they are certain to lose at trial, according to the court. 78
The court finally noted that Congress alone has the power to define crimes and
defenses, and that Congress has said that the legitimate medical purpose exception
is a defense, not an element.79
2. The Third Circuit
In United States v. Polan, a physician was indicted and convicted of one
conspiracy count and thirty-one substantive counts of distributing oxycodone in
violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The physician was charged
with writing prescriptions for individuals who he was aware would turn over the
prescribed drugs to a co-conspirator, who subsequently would sell the drugs or barter
them for sexual favors.80 The defendant raised a post-conviction argument that the
indictment failed to charge an essential element of the offense of illegal drug
distribution.81 Because the challenge to the indictment was tardy, the indictment was
construed in favor of the government. 82
The Third Circuit relied on the 1922 Supreme Court case McKelvey v. United
States, where the court concluded that it was
a settled rule . . . that an indictment or other pleading founded on a general provision
defining the elements of an offense, or of a right conferred, need not negative the
matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the
same section or elsewhere, and that it is incumbent on one who relies on such an
exception to set it up and establish it.83

The court stated that this rule from McKelvey was “codified” in 21 U.S.C
section 885(a)(1).84 It then held that there are three elements to illegal drug
distribution by a physician: “the physician must (1) knowingly or intentionally (2)
distribute (3) a controlled substance,” and that allegations that the drug distribution
was not authorized by the Attorney General are not required in an indictment due to
section 885(a)(1) and McKelvey.85
The court noted that the Ninth and Fifth Circuits did not address section
885(a)(1), “which is clearly controlling unless its application in this situation is
unconstitutional,” and that the arguments by those circuits were therefore
unpersuasive.86 It addressed the Outler court’s suggestion that an exception may be
essential enough to a crime that it becomes an element of the crime, stating that it
was “not persuaded by this argument because essentially the same argument can be
made with respect to every statutory exception.” 87 The court held that it could not
refuse to follow section 885(a)(1) and McKelvey “simply because it could in theory
78

Id.
Id. at 1320.
80
United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1992).
81
Id. at 1282.
82
Id.
79

83
84

McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922).

Polan, 970 F.2d at 1282.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1283.
87
Id. at 1283 n.1.
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result in abusive indictments of physicians—an eventuality that apparently has not
occurred in the 22 years since this provision was enacted.” 88
3. The Seventh Circuit
In United States v. Roya, the defendant-physician was convicted of twenty-four
counts of controlled substance distribution for prescribing stimulant drugs to
undercover agents after minimal examinations and despite the agents’ statements
indicating that they were sharing the drugs with others. 89 All counts of the indictment
alleged that the defendant either “dispensed or . . . attempted to dispense controlled
substances ‘pursuant to a prescription not written in the course of professional
practice.’”90 However, the defendant-physician argued that the indictment was
“vague, uncertain, and failed to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusations
against him with the certainty required by law” because, among other things, “(1) it
failed to cite the regulation, the violation of which was the essence of the charge
against him, [and] (2) it failed to state an element of the offense which was included
in the regulation.”91 The defendant took issue with the fact that the indictment used
the “not written in the course of professional practice” language without citing to the
Attorney General’s regulation containing this language, 21 C.F.R. section
1304.04(a), and that it did not contain the “without a legitimate medical purpose”
language also found in 21 C.F.R. section 1306.04(a).92
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s characterization of the
indictment and concluded that the indictment “clearly stated the essential elements
of the offense and that the disputed language merely clarified the grand jury's
position that the accused did not fit within an exemption to the charged offense.” 93
The court wrote that
the disputed language, in our opinion, was not essential to a properly drawn
indictment. An indictment founded on a general provision of a statute need not
negative an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the
same section or elsewhere. Addition of such language, therefore, should not render
an indictment defective.94

The court noted that inclusion of this language was not necessary to “properly
charge[] this defendant, in a manner making the charge sufficiently clear to him, that
he had dispensed in a manner not exempted under the statute.”95 According to the
court, the indictment did not “render[] the defendant unable to prepare a defense
adequately, to have caused him surprise at trial, or to have placed him in double
jeopardy.”96
88
89
90

Id.

United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1978).

Id. at 390.
91
Id. at 389-90.
92
Id. at 390-91.
93
Id.

Id. at 391 (citing McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922); United
States v. DiPietroantonio, 289 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1961)).
94
95
96

Id. at 391.
Id.
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4. The Sixth Circuit
Finally, in United States v. Seelig, three defendant-pharmacists appealed their
convictions for distributing Valium and codeine-based cough medicine
Dextropropoxyphene (both opiates) in violation of section 841(a)(1).97 The
defendants objected to the fact that the indictment failed to charge them with acting
“not in the usual course of professional practice,” as “pharmacists are exempt from
the criminal sanctions of section 841(a)(1) if they dispense drugs in the usual course
of professional practice.” 98 Because the indictment alleged the date, serial number,
and issuing doctors of the prescriptions in question, the court was unconcerned by
the possibility that the defendants might not have enough facts to avoid being
prosecuted again for the same crime. 99 In a somewhat circular opinion, the court
held that because,
[a]s a matter of law, a registered doctor is subject to the criminal penalties of section
841(a)(1) if he is not acting within the usual course of professional conduct . . . the
allegation of distribution in violation of section 841(a)(1) includes the legal
definition that the drugs were not . . . distributed in the usual course of professional
practice.100

In other words, an indictment alleging illegal distribution of controlled
substances incorporates the allegation that those substances were not distributed in
the usual course of professional practice, even when it does not explicitly state that
element.
D. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari
In many of the above cases, either the government or the individual defendant
submitted a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court asking the Court to
weigh in on the issue of indictments against doctors charged with illegal drug
distribution.101 For instance, defendant William Steele petitioned the Court to review
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in United States v. Steele.102 The question presented
in Steele’s petition was whether
an indictment charging a practitioner . . . with dispensing a controlled substance in
violation of Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21, United States Code, meet[s] the
constitutional standards for an indictment established by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution if it fails to allege that the defendant’s
conduct in dispensing the controlled substance was outside the scope of professional
practice?103
97
98

United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1980).

Id. at 211.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See generally, e.g., Polan v. United States, 513 U.S. 1050 (1994); Outler v. United States, 455
U.S. 950 (1982); Seelig v. United States, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Roya v. United States, 439 U.S.
857 (1978) (denying petitions for writ of certiorari).
102
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998)
(No. 94–3139), 1999 WL 33640050 (U.S.).
103
Id. at *i.
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However, despite the conflicting positions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal, the
Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari petitions on this issue. 104
E. The Circuit Courts that Require Indictments to Allege that Controlled Substance
Distribution Took Place Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose and Not in the
Usual Course of Professional Practice Take the Correct Approach
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected petitions for writ of certiorari
on the issue of indictments against doctors charged under section 841(a)(1), the
severity of the opioid epidemic and the Department of Justice’s subsequent
crackdown on doctors prescribing opioids makes this issue newly relevant, and at
some point the Court may decide to finally address the issue. Furthermore, a number
of circuits have yet to conclusively rule on this issue, leaving little guidance for both
federal prosecutors preparing indictments and federal district court judges ruling on
motions to dismiss indictments for failure to state a claim. Courts that have not yet
addressed this issue should follow the logic of the Fifth, Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth
Circuits, and require that indictments against physicians for violation of section
841(a)(1) allege that the physician distributed controlled substances without a
legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional practice.
The circuits that have held otherwise have leaned heavily on 21 U.S.C. section
885(a)(1) in concluding that prescription without a legitimate medical purpose need
not be alleged in an indictment. According to these circuits, section 885(a)(1)
reflects the clear intention of Congress that prescription without a legitimate medical
purpose is an exception to, not an element of, illegal drug distribution. However,
there are a number of issues with this reading of the statute.
1. Congress Cannot Relieve the Government of Its Obligation to Charge Each
Element of a Crime in an Indictment, and Section 885(a)(1) Should Not Be Read to
Do So
First, while
defining criminal conduct is a task generally ‘left to the legislative branch,’
Congress may not manipulate the definition of a crime in a way that relieves the
Government of its constitutional obligations to charge each element in the
indictment, submit each element to the jury, and prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt.”105

The Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature may label facts otherwise,
but that these facts may nevertheless may be “‘traditional elements’ to which these
safeguards were intended to apply.”106 Here, as the Fifth Circuit concluded in Outler
(discussed supra), prescription without a medical purpose lies at the heart of the
offense of illegal drug distribution for physicians. Congress almost certainly cannot
have intended to imply that the millions of medical professionals distributing
controlled substances across the country are presumptively guilty of a federal felony
104

See supra note 101 (listing cases denying certiorari).
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) (internal citations omitted), overruled on
other grounds by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
106
Id.
105
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unless they prove that their prescription was legitimate in a court of law.107 While
the Third Circuit feared that this reading of section 885(a)(1) would necessitate
reading every statutory exception as an element, it seems plain that not all exceptions
are as crucial to the definition of the crime as the exception for licensed doctors
lawfully prescribing medicine. 108
Adding to the idea that acting without a legitimate medical purpose is an element
of controlled substance distribution for physicians is the undisputed fact that “lack
of a legitimate medical purpose” must be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even within circuits holding that indictments need not allege that doctors acted
without a legitimate medical purpose, the United States Attorney’s Office routinely
urges judges to instruct juries that they cannot find physician-defendants guilty
unless it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they acted outside the usual course
of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose, and judges
routinely honor these requests. For instance, in a case where a physician was charged
with distribution of a controlled substance in the Middle District of Florida, which is
located within the Eleventh Circuit, the United States Attorney’s Office asked the
judge to instruct the jury that:
The Defendant can be found guilty only if all the following facts are proved beyond
a reasonable doubt:
The Defendant distributed or dispensed the controlled substances alleged in the
indictment;
The Defendant did so knowingly and intentionally, that is to say, that the Defendant
knew the substance was a controlled substance under the law; and
The Defendant did so either for no legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual
course of professional practice.109

107

Controlled substances, it should be noted, range from methamphetamine and heroin to
Robitussin and Lunesta. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-1308.15.
108
The Third Circuit also relies heavily on McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922), the
holding of which the Court claims is the foundation of § 885(a)(1). McKelvey is a 100-year-old
case concerning an apparent band of rouge cowboys who obstructed at gunpoint a group of sheep
farmers from moving their flock across federal public lands. 260 U.S. at 354-55. The cowboys
were indicted under a federal law stating that:
no person, by force, threats, intimidation, or by any fencing or inclosing, or any other unlawful
means, shall prevent or obstruct, or shall combine and confederate with others to prevent or
obstruct, any person from peaceably entering upon or establishing a settlement or residence on
any tract of public land subject to settlement or entry under the public land laws of the United
States, or shall prevent or obstruct free passage or transit over or through the public lands:
Provided, this section shall not be held to affect the right or title of persons, who have gone upon,
improved or occupied said lands under the land laws of the United States, claiming title thereto,
in good faith.
260 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added). This statute, carving out a narrow exception for homesteaders
sprinkled throughout hundreds of millions of acres of federal public lands, appears patently
different from a statute that, taking the Third Circuit’s view, would subject the over one million
physicians practicing in the United States to a federal indictment unless they could prove that they
were not one of a relative handful of bad actors prescribing drugs without a medical purpose.
109
Proposed Jury Instructions at 26, United States v. Gayden¸ No. 6:16-cr-187-Orl-41TBS (M.D.
Fla. June 4, 2018); see also, e.g., Transcript of Jury Instructions and Verdict at 27-28, United
States v. Chapman, No. 4:11-CR-22-HLM-05 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2016) (“[T]he defendant can be
found guilty of the offenses charged . . . only if all of the following facts are proven beyond a

2020]

DO NO HARM OR INJUSTICE TO THEM

215

By acknowledging that acting “for no legitimate medical purpose or outside the
usual course of professional practice” is a fact that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the government recognizes that that fact is an element of the crime
of controlled substance distribution for physicians. 110 Because there is a
constitutional right that all elements of a crime must be alleged in an indictment, it
logically follows that the fact that the government itself contends is an element must
be alleged in criminal indictments against physicians for controlled substance
distribution.
Judge Leonard Sand noted that a reading of section 885(a) that “shift[s] the
burden of proving that the prescriptions were issued for a legitimate medical purpose
to the defendant”—and which thereby makes authorized prescriptions an
exception—“raises serious constitutional questions . . . . The most sensible and
constitutionally acceptable way to read section 885 is simply as placing on a
defendant physician an initial burden of production [of the fact that he is a registered
medical practitioner].”111 In Black, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the
government by its own evidence established that [the defendant] was a
‘practitioner.’”112 Almost inevitably, when a physician is charged with illegal drug
distribution the government will produce evidence that the defendant is a medical
professional, thereby satisfying the initial burden of production which then brings
the “no legitimate medical purpose” element to the table. It seems likely that section
885(a) was not intended to make prescription without a legitimate medical purpose
a fact that need not be alleged in an indictment, but rather, was intended to safeguard
against a scenario where a defendant who was not known to be a physician by the
government could claim that an indictment was improper for not alleging that the
defendant acted without a legitimate medical purpose. 113 In that case, the
government would not be required to affirmatively “negative” the possibility that the
defendant might be a physician registered with the Attorney General. However, in
the vast majority of cases against doctors, federal prosecutors are aware that the
defendants are doctors, and therefore section 885(a)(1) is not relevant to these cases.
2. The Premise that Prosecutors will use Section 841(a)(1) Responsibly is Flawed
Both the Eleventh and the Third Circuits lean on the idea that even if federal
reasonable doubt as to each count: First: That the defendant dispensed a controlled substance or
caused a controlled substance to be dispensed as charged in the particular count of the indictment;
Two: That the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; and Third: That the defendant either
acted outside the usual course of professional practice or acted without a legitimate medical
purpose.”).
110
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
111
Sand, supra note 57, Instruction 56.18.
112
United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1975).
113
See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 494 F.2d 783, 785–87 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
indictment did not need to allege that defendant was not authorized to distribute heroin because
he, unlike a registered physician, was not included within any of the statutory categories that
would allow him to distribute controlled substances lawfully); see also Echavarria–Olarte v.
Reno, 35 F.3d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that indictment did not need to charge that the
defendant possessed or imported drugs “unlawfully” where “nothing in the record indicates that
[the defendant] is a doctor or other person permitted to distribute or import cocaine”).
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prosecutors could indict physicians across the country, they would not pursue such
cases when there would be little chance of success. This is all but certain, they claim,
as “there has been no report of prosecutors running amuck” against doctors. 114 There
are two issues with this logic. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that
“we cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will
‘use it responsibly.’”115 Where the Court has had the option between relying on “the
Government’s discretion to protect against overzealous prosecutions” or narrowing
its interpretation of a statute, it has concluded that “a statute . . . that can linguistically
be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be
the latter.”116
The second problem with this line of reasoning is that prosecutors very well may
abuse their discretion in indicting physicians. While the Third Circuit claimed that
no abusive indictments of physicians have been reported since the statute’s
enactment, it does not appear that that court undertook a comprehensive study of
physicians indicted for federal drug distribution. Even a relatively cursory inquiry
into physicians acquitted on federal drug charges reveals a litany of complaints of
overzealous prosecutors indicting doctors on evidence juries did not find convincing.
One defense attorney, whose client was acquitted of nineteen counts of unlawful
controlled substance distribution, stated:
We believe that the jury’s decision should send a message to the federal government
that we cannot try to paper over the opioid crisis by scapegoating doctors who are
simply trying to do their jobs in treating people with debilitating pain. The
government needs to address the real problem of addiction and treatment and leave
our hardworking doctors alone. Dr. Szyman worked hard to take care of his patients.
And the government was wrong to interfere with that. The jury’s verdict made that
statement loud and clear.117

The Department of Justice, under the gaze of the Trump White House, has
made no secret of the fact that it is zealously prosecuting physicians whom it believes
114

United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998); see also United Stated v. Polan,
970 F.2d 1280, 1283, 1283 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992).
115
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372-73 (2016) (quoting United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)).
116
Id. at 2373 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 408,
412 (1999)).
117
Doctor Found Not Guilty of Overprescribing Painkillers, FOX 11 NEWS (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://fox11online.com/news/local/doctor-found-not-guilty-of-overprescribing-painkillers
[https://perma.cc/6AAC-AEW8]; see also Alabama Doctor Acquitted in Rock Guitarist’s
Overdose Death, U.S. NEWS.COM (May 22, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/alabama/articles/2018-05-22/alabama-doctor-acquitted-in-rock-guitarists-overdose-death
[https://perma.cc/WUZ2-SLU4] (Defense attorney for doctor acquitted of thirteen counts of
federal unlawful drug distribution “described his client as a ‘good person and a good doctor’ and
said federal prosecutor [sic] had ‘wrecked’ his reputation and medical practice.”); Carrie
Teegardin, Doctors and the Opioid Crisis: an AJC National Investigation, AJC.COM (Dec. 1,
2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/public-affairs/healers-dealers/wrKUc6J0p2sz4dFi3fwXJK/
[https://perma.cc/S3YC-AQDE] (Defense attorney for physician charged with drug distribution
stated that “[u]nfortunately, too often when law enforcement disagrees with how a doctor is
treating his or her patients, rather than simply referring the issue to a medical board that has the
ability and expertise to deal with any particular situation, they want to call it criminal conduct.”).
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are improperly prescribing opioids.118 Assistant United States Attorney Bill Powell,
after a recent conviction of a West Virginia physician for improper opioid
distribution, stated that “[i]llegal distribution of opioids by physicians has been and
continues to be a high priority for prosecution in this district . . . . Physicians who
believe they can hide behind their lab coats or medical licenses, and simultaneously
stoke the fires of the opioid epidemic and profit from it are sadly mistaken.” 119 While
in the 1990s the Third and Eleventh Circuits scoffed at the idea that prosecutors may
abusively indict physicians, the complex reality of the opioid crisis has led
prosecutors to aggressively pursue physicians for drug crimes. In this new reality, it
is evident that the protections offered by the requirement of a grand jury indictment
are all the more necessary as a check on over-zealous prosecutors.
3. Medical Professionals and Their Patients Are Particularly Harmed by Imprecise
Indictments
“The power to indict is the power to destroy. For the defendant, an indictment
hurts everywhere—in the family, business, and community. At the end of the road,
the indictment can lead to loss of liberty and financial ruin.” 120 This is particularly
evident in the case of physicians indicted for drug distribution, as these medical
professionals cannot make their livelihood without a medical license and the ability
to prescribe controlled substances. In nearly every case of a physician charged with
improper drug distribution, the state medical board has responded after either the
indictment or a finding of guilt by suspending or revoking the physician’s license. 121
While revoking a license post-conviction presents fewer issues, medical boards that
suspend professional licenses after an indictment can gravely affect the lives of
physicians and their patients while those physicians remain legally innocent.
Physicians may also be subject to bail conditions preventing them from prescribing
controlled substances, effectively robbing them of their ability to practice medicine
even before the medical board steps in.
In Dr. Olivieri’s case, for example, many of the physician’s HIV-positive
patients, who were “dependent on him for continuity of care and the refilling of their
needed prescriptions,” were left in the lurch when their doctor of many decades was
suddenly stripped of his ability to provide them with medical care.122 Dr. Olivieri’s
patients were at least lucky in that there are many other physicians in the New York
City area. For rural patients, however, the indictment of their physician can leave
them scrambling to find someone to fill their needed prescriptions. Of 378 doctors
charged with controlled substance distribution (249 charged federally and 131
118

See Attorney General Sessions Remarks, supra note 3.
West Virginia Physician Convicted of Illegal Opioid Distribution to Patients, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE N. DIST. OF W. VA. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usaondwv/pr/west-virginia-physician-convicted-illegal-opioid-distribution-patients
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121
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Substances Outside of Legitimate Medical Need, 2 NAGTRI J., 40, 44 (2017),
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charged under the equivalent state laws), 121 specialized in family medicine—the
medical practice specialty that provides the majority of care for underserved and
rural populations.123 In rural areas, the loss of even one physician can have drastic
consequences on wide swaths of patients. For instance, when two rural doctors
stopped prescribing opioids due to warnings from the Drug Enforcement Agency
(“DEA”), roughly 230 patients were affected, several of whom committed suicide
when they could not find another doctor who could help them ease their chronic
pain.124
The dramatic loss of livelihood for physicians and, even more importantly, loss
of medical treatment for underserved communities, should be avoided whenever
possible. Ensuring that indictments against physicians properly allege that those
physicians acted without a legitimate medical purpose does not simply satisfy an
abstract (albeit important) constitutional requirement. Rather, it ensures that patients
are not deprived of their medical provider unless a grand jury determines that there
is probable cause to believe that the provider acted without a legitimate medical
purpose.
4. Most Physicians Indicted for Controlled Substance Distribution Plead Guilty,
and Guilty Pleas are Particularly Burdensome for Licensed Medical Professionals
Out of roughly 268 doctors investigated by the DEA and ultimately found guilty
of either a federal or state crimes between 2003 and 2017, 222 pled guilty or no
contest, while only 46 were convicted by a jury. 125 While this number is actually
somewhat lower than the overall percentage of state and federal crimes that result in
plea bargains,126 the vast majority of physicians do not have the facts of their case
decided by juries that finds them guilty of each element of their alleged crimes.
Because most physicians indicted for controlled substance distribution,
including opioid distribution, do not make it to a jury trial, it is even more vital that
each element a prosecutor is required to prove at trial be alleged in an indictment
against a physician. Otherwise, a real possibility exists that a physician could be
indicted for controlled substance distribution and choose strategically to plead guilty
to avoid jail time—even in cases where a grand jury has not found probable cause to
believe the physician acted without a legitimate medical purpose.
Guilty pleas are particularly burdensome for physicians because, as noted above,
medical boards nearly always respond to a finding of a physician’s guilt by revoking
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or suspending the physician’s license.127 Physicians facing an indictment for
controlled substance distribution may face the choice between going to trial and
risking jail time or pleading guilty to receive a favorable sentence but losing their
livelihood in the process. Because an indictment against a physician can trigger an
array of consequences for the physician without the facts ever reaching a jury, it is
crucial that a grand jury find that there is probable cause to believe the physician
acted without a legitimate medical purpose.
II. ISSUES WITH THE “WITHOUT A LEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE” ELEMENT
A. How the Element is Defined
Despite the split in authority surrounding the issue of whether the prescription
without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional
practice (the “without a legitimate medical purpose element”) must be alleged in an
indictment, there is little controversy over the fact that
once evidence is presented that the defendant was a medical practitioner duly
registered to dispense controlled substances, as will be in virtually every case in
which a physician is prosecuted under section 841(a), the government must shoulder
its normal burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.128

Therefore, even in circuits where the without a legitimate medical purpose
element is not required to be alleged in an indictment, the jury must be instructed
that “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt [] that the defendant
prescribed (or dispensed) the drug other than for a legitimate medical purpose and
not in the usual course of medical practice.”129 However, this element has proven to
be murky and difficult to define, making it equally difficult to defend against.
“‘[P]rofessional practice’ . . . refers to generally accepted medical practice.” 130
“The term ‘professional practice’ implies at least that there exists a reputable group
of people in the medical profession who agree that a given approach to prescribing
controlled substances is consistent with legitimate medical treatment.” 131 Courts
127

McKee, supra note 121, at 44.
Sand, supra note 57, at Instruction 56.02.
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Sand, supra note 57, at Instruction 56-18.; see also United States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300, 305
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substance(s) as charged; and Second: That at the time of the distribution or dispensing, the
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have allowed the Government to call expert witnesses to testify as to the standard of
care for physicians, including the standards outlined in the American Medical
Association’s (“AMA”) guidelines, in order to help define this element, noting that
“violation of the ethical norms and regulations may be relevant to aid the jury in
understanding what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of
professional practice.”132
However, mere medical malpractice is not enough to convict:
A violation of the standard of care alone is insufficient to support the criminal
conviction of a licensed practitioner under § 841(a) . . . the district court must ensure
that the benchmark for criminal liability is the higher showing that the practitioner
intentionally has distributed controlled substances for no legitimate medical purpose
and outside the usual course of professional practice.133

Merely negligent prescriptions are insufficient for criminal liability. However,
“[u]nder the guise of treatment a physician cannot sell drugs to a dealer nor distribute
drugs intended to cater to cravings of an addict . . . . Congress did not intend for
doctors to create drug ‘pushers.’” 134
B. Criticism of the Element
The line between a physician acting negligently but within the scope of
professional practice and a “drug pusher” may strike a reader as unclear and circular.
Doctors and defense attorneys typically agree. In 2015, prominent criminal defense
attorney Harvey Silverglate penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal criticizing
the element as “far from clear,” and calling for legislators and prosecutors to either
“clarify the currently indecipherable line between treating pain and unlawfully
feeding drug addicts’ habits, or get out of the business of policing and terrorizing
physicians.”135 Silverglate claimed that “the government uses legal ambiguity for
tactical advantage and will not readily clarify the lines it expects doctors to follow at
132

United States v. Hoffman, No. 06-CR-66-P-S, 2006 WL 3691487, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 12,
2006); see also Order on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Certain Testimony of Gary
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their peril . . . . Drug warriors collect the scalps of doctors whom they accuse of
violating the laws; they have no concern in aiding the relief of patients’ suffering.”136
Silverglate was particularly concerned with the lack of federal guidance on
narcotic administration. In 2004, the DEA released a pamphlet somewhat clarifying
“the line between legitimate medical practice and criminal over-prescription.”137
However, the DEA withdrew that guidance less than two months later (timed,
perhaps suspiciously, with the federal prosecution of a pain physician in Virginia),
leaving doctors with “no official guidance about how much OxyContin [an opioid]
is enough to relieve their patients’ pain, and how much could land them in prison.” 138
Since Silverglate’s op-ed was published, there has been some effort to clarify
the federal line between legitimate opioid prescription and criminal overprescription. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) issued its
first national guidelines regarding opioid prescriptions in 2016, which addressed “1)
when to initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain; 2) opioid selection, dosage,
duration, follow-up, and discontinuation; and 3) assessing risk and addressing harms
of opioid use.”139 However, while these guidelines were purportedly developed with
“input from experts, stakeholders, the public, peer reviewers, and a federally
chartered advisory committee,”140 they have received significant criticism.
The most notable criticism of the guidelines has been from the AMA—the very
group that federal prosecutors often look to in defining the contours of generally
accepted professional practice for physicians. In November 2018, the AMA adopted
a number of resolutions criticizing the CDC guidelines, particularly its guidance as
to the maximum recommended opioid dose.141 The AMA resolved that “some
patients with acute or chronic pain can benefit from taking opioids at greater dosages
than recommended by the CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for chronic pain
and that such care may be medically necessary and appropriate,” and further resolved
that the guidelines should not be used
as anything more than guidance, and physicians should not be subject to professional
discipline, loss of board certification, loss of clinical privileges, criminal
prosecution, civil liability, or other penalties or practice limitations solely for
prescribing opioids at a quantitative level above the MME thresholds found in the
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids.142

At an AMA meeting in November 2018, Barbara McAneny, MD, the president
of the AMA, recounted a story of a patient to whom she prescribed opioids in order
136
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to combat the pain of metastatic prostate cancer, and who was denied by a pharmacy
that relied on the CDC guidelines.143 The man attempted suicide three days later,
McAneny recounted, noting that “[m]y patient suffered, in part, because of the
crackdown on opioids.”144
C. Difficulties with Clarifying the Element
Given the debate within the medical community as to the standard of care for
opioid prescriptions, the without a legitimate medical purpose element seems nearly
impossible to define, much less to disprove. Some courts have sought to clarify this
standard by:
[G]lean[ing] from reported cases certain recurring concomitance of condemned
behavior, examples of which include the following:
(1) An inordinately large quantity of controlled substances was prescribed.
(2) Large numbers of prescriptions were issued.
(3) No physical examination was given.
(4) The physician warned the patient to fill prescriptions at different drug
stores.
(5) The physician issued prescriptions to a patient known to be delivering the
drugs to others.
(6) The physician prescribed controlled drugs at intervals inconsistent with
legitimate medical treatment.
(7) The physician involved used street slang rather than medical terminology
for the drugs prescribed.
(8) There was no logical relationship between the drugs prescribed and
treatment of the condition allegedly existing.
(9) The physician wrote more than one prescription on occasions in order to
spread them out.145

However, courts have also noted that these factors are “not an exclusive and
exhaustive list of the types of conduct by which a physician can breach the limits of
legitimate medical practice” and that they do not “establish some minimum number
of types of conduct that must be present to permit submission to the jury of the
legitimate medical practice issue.”146 Those courts have faulted defendants for
attempting to take a “mechanistic approach” to the element.147 Furthermore, this list
143
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comes from a compilation of cases where defendants were tried and convicted of the
same vague law that the list seeks to clarify.
As it stands, juries are told that defendants must have acted more than
negligently in prescribing medications, to the point where no reputable group of
physicians would find that the prescription had a legitimate medical purpose.
However, when it comes to opioid prescriptions, there appears to be little consensus
as to what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose. The CDC has promulgated
guidelines for opioid prescriptions, but these guidelines have been criticized by the
AMA. Meanwhile courts have allowed the government to present expert witnesses
to testify as to the standards governing medical practices, despite the fact that a
violation of professional standards alone is, at least in theory, not enough to impose
criminal liability on doctors. And, while courts have attempted to provide examples
of the type of conduct that is outside the course of professional practice, physicians
are warned that these examples are not exhaustive. Against this backdrop,
Silverglate’s fear that the vague standard for acting without a legitimate medical
purpose “puts physicians in great legal jeopardy, and too often leaves their patients
to suffer needlessly” appears to remain well-founded.148
D. Effect on Elderly and Rural Physicians
These vague standards are particularly harmful for older or rural physicians,
who are often overburdened with patients and not up to speed on the latest in medical
ethics and best practices. Of the 378 physicians charged with controlled substance
distribution under federal law or equivalent state laws between 2006 and 2016, over
forty percent were over the age of sixty.149 These physicians, who admittedly may
not follow best practices in prescribing controlled substances, may end up convicted
of a federal felony for what is ultimately poor, but non-criminal, medical judgment.
For instance, Dr. Joel A. Sabean, a 69-year-old dermatologist from Falmouth, Maine,
was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison for, among other charges, drug
distribution for other than legitimate medical purposes.150 Dr. Sabean was convicted
after writing prescriptions for the schedule IV controlled substances Ambien,
Lunesta, and Xanax for his daughter, who lived in Florida, while Dr. Sabean
remained in Maine.151 Dr. Sabean did not dispute that he prescribed his daughter
these medications, or that he knew that they were controlled substances.152 However,
he argued at trial and on appeal that treatment of family members by physicians did
not rise to drug distribution without a legitimate medical purpose.153
In a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the government’s medical
148
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expert, Dr. Sabean noted that the Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine’s
regulations did not prohibit him from treating family members or prescribing them
controlled substances.154 He argued that allowing the expert to testify as to the
American Medical Associations Code of Ethics, which state that a physician may not
treat family members except in emergency situations, had “the strong potential to
confuse the jury as to the mens rea required in this case. Because the danger of such
confusion substantially outweighs the probative value of a description of such
standards, testimony as to such standards [must be] excluded.”155
Dr. Sabean did not prevail on his motion in limine to exclude the expert opinion
regarding the AMA ethical guidelines.156 On appeal, the First Circuit, in upholding
the lower court ruling, noted that:
There is no pat formula describing what proof is required to ground a finding that a
defendant acted outside the usual course of professional practice. Rather, inquiring
courts must approach the issue on a case-by-case basis and sift the evidence in a
given case to determine whether a specific set of facts will support a guilty verdict.
In conducting this tamisage, testimony from a medical or pharmacological expert
may be helpful—but such expert testimony is not a sine qua non to a finding of guilt.
Jurors, of course, may draw on their everyday experience, and they can be expected
to have some familiarity with how doctors care for patients. It follows, we think,
that jurors may infer bad faith from conduct that is commonly understood to be
plainly unprofessional.157

While not specifically an opioid crime, the path that led to Dr. Sabean’s
conviction is indicative of the perils faced by physicians prescribing controlled
substances, especially when they are older and rural. Dr. Sabean’s conviction for
acts which, while inadvisable, are at best ethically suspect,158 rested in the hands of
jurors who were tasked with drawing on their own non-professional perceptions
about how doctors should act. While jurors are advised that the standard for
prescription without a legitimate purpose is higher than a malpractice standard, they
are given little guidance as to what that higher standard might be. Meanwhile, Dr.
Sabean was incarcerated for two years, his medical practice shuttered and employees
let go, and his patients were left without the benefit of an experienced and respected
physician whom some of them had seen for over thirty years.159
154
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E. Solutions
The “without a medical purpose” element as it stands is difficult for both
physicians and juries to comprehend. One means of clarifying the element would be
to administratively codify the opioid guidelines published by the CDC, and to set
similar guidelines with regard to other controlled substances. While the AMA has
criticized the CDC opioid guidelines for setting the maximum opioid dosage levels
too low for some patients with chronic pain, physicians would have the security of a
bright-line rule which clearly states the threshold for criminal liability.
Alternatively, Congress could draft legislation that removes physicians from the
scope of section 841(a) by creating a separate criminal statute tailored specifically to
physicians who overprescribe controlled substances. As it stands, a clunky statutory
mechanism prohibits everyone, including physicians, from distributing controlled
substances, and then exempts those physicians from criminal liability when they
register with the Attorney General and distribute the substances for a legitimate
medical purpose. Congress could instead pass legislation which affirmatively states
that registered physicians are authorized to distribute controlled substances, while
also setting out a set of specific instances where distribution is prohibited–such as
when a certain dosage or number of prescriptions are prescribed or when the
physician knowingly prescribes controlled substances to a patient known to abuse or
sell the substances.
Investigating, indicting, and convicting a physician for controlled substance
distribution presents a number of highly scientific considerations that make
prosecuting physicians distinct from prosecuting civilians. While currently judges
and juries are tasked with deciding when distribution of controlled substances by a
physician is without a legitimate medical purpose, Congress is the body that is best
equipped to study and hear testimony on technical medical issues.
Finally, federal prosecutors could move away from prosecuting individual
physicians and simply instruct the DEA to inform state medical licensing boards
about suspicious or problematic prescribing practices by doctors. Medical licensing
boards have the power to suspend or revoke physicians’ medical licenses, which
ultimately can have the effect of removing a doctor who is overprescribing opioids
from medical practice without subjecting these physicians to the loss of liberty that
typically results from a federal criminal conviction or guilty plea.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTING PHYSICIANS UNDER SECTION 841(A) AS A
MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE OPIOID CRISIS
While criminal prosecutions of physicians can be improved, ultimately,
prosecuting physicians is not the most effective means of targeting the root causes
id. at Exhibit R (“If Dr. Sabean serves jail time, he will not be the only one who suffers. Not only
will thousands of patients lose a great dermatologist, his employees will lose a great boss and
friend.”); id. at Exhibit S (“Professionally, Joel was our family dermatologist for over thirty years.
He is a special gem in this area.”); id. at Exhibit T (“Over approximately the past forty-three years
that I have known him, Dr. Sabean has taken care of my entire family . . . Dr. Sabean saved my
father’s life. . . . I urged him to see Dr. Sabean, who, upon examining my father, found melanoma
in two places.”).
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of the opioid epidemic. Even without the specter of criminal prosecution, physicians
who overprescribe controlled substances face the much lower bar that is required for
state medical boards to revoke their professional licenses and deprive them of their
abilities to practice medicine and make a living, as well as the (theoretically) lower
bar of civil medical malpractice suits by the families of victims of over prescription.
While often prosecutors target individual physicians, the massive corporations at the
root of the opioid crisis are a better target for the legal system.
A. The Origins of the Opioid Crisis
OxyContin, the drug at the heart of the opioid crisis, was first approved by the
Food and Drug Administration in 1995.160 The drug was developed by Purdue
Frederick, a pharmaceutical company owned by a trio of wealthy brothers—
Mortimer, Raymond, and Arthur Sackler. 161 Purdue Pharma, the marketing arm of
Purdue Frederick, stated from the outset that “the risk of addiction when taking an
opioid is one-half of 1 percent.”162
The idea that OxyContin, a synthetic derivative of opium, could have a low risk
of addiction was at odds with history. Opium and its derivatives, including morphine
and heroin, had been known sources of addiction for centuries. 163 After the Civil
War, roughly a hundred thousand veterans became addicted to the morphine that
doctors routinely prescribed to treat their injuries. 164 At the end of the nineteenth
century, heroin, which is twice as powerful as morphine, and initially believed to be
nonaddictive, was discovered and soon sold all over the world, lacing everything
from cough drops to baby-soothing syrups.165 Within a decade, however, heroin’s
devastating addictive qualities were recognized, and by 1924, manufacturing it was
officially illegal in the United States. 166
Despite the history of opiate addiction in the United States, in the mid-1990s
prescribing OxyContin was marketed as “the moral, responsible, and compassionate
thing to do—and not just for dying people . . . but also for folks with moderate back
injuries, wisdom-tooth surgery, bronchitis, and temporomandibular joint
disorder.”167 OxyContin hit the market just as the medical community began to treat
pain as a vital sign in need of greater focus and treatment, and Purdue seized on this
mindset in their marketing schemes. 168 One Virginia emergency medicine doctor
stated that, in response to the newfound focus on pain scales and pain relief, “[e]very
single physician I knew at the time was told to be much more serious about making
pain a priority . . . . All it did was drive up our opioid prescribing without really
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understanding the consequences of what we were doing.” 169
Purdue realized early on that OxyContin was most successful in small, rural
towns.170 It purchased data to figure out which physicians prescribed the most of
their competitors’ drugs, and sent representatives to pitch OxyContin and its alleged
safe and potent pain relief.171 Representatives were known to gift doctors lunches,
dinners, golf outings, and numerous branded products in order to promote
OxyContin.172 Often, these were “impressionable young doctors, fresh meat with a
lifetime of prescribing ahead.”173 By 2001, sales-rep bonuses topped forty billion
dollars (up from one million dollars in 1996).174 Representatives routinely handed
out “starter coupons” giving patients free thirty-day supplies of OxyContin, and
Purdue Pharma paid for over five thousand doctors, nurses, and pharmacists to attend
pain management conferences in resorts from Florida to Arizona during the first five
years of the drug’s existence.175 All this as opioid-related overdoses, robberies,
violent crimes, and deaths were already beginning to skyrocket in rural communities
from Virginia to Maine, as well as in large cities and suburbs across the East Coast,
Deep South, and Southwest.176
Purdue claimed that it was unaware of OxyContin’s potential for abuse until
2000. However, as early as 1995, when it submitted its New Drug Application with
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), it was clear that the company knew of the
drug’s dark downsides; that the drug could be crushed up and snorted, leading to its
immediate (instead of controlled) release; that, when liquified and injected, sixtyeight percent of the drug was recoverable; and that in patient trials, several patients
had experienced symptoms of withdrawal.177 Despite these findings, the FDA
allowed Purdue to market OxyContin’s long-acting formulation as “believed to
reduce” its addictive nature.178 In 1998, a study and accompanying editorial
published in The Journal of the Canadian Medical Association found that, in reality,
drug users and dealers “coveted” long-acting opioids like OxyContin.179 While
Purdue knew of this study, it did not disclose it to the FDA or to its sales reps, whom
the company continued to use to push their narrative of the drug’s non-addictive
nature.180 By 2001, when the addictive nature of OxyContin had become more
widely known, Richard Sackler—the son of Raymond Sackler and the then-president
of Purdue Pharma—wrote an email advising that the company push the blame onto
169
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the very consumers who had unwittingly become addicted to his company’s drug,
stating that “[w]e have to hammer on abusers in every way possible. . . . They are
the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.” 181 Even in 2007, when
Purdue Pharma had already entered into one settlement with the Justice Department
and attorneys general in other states were suing, Purdue continued to push
OxyContin onto veterans and the elderly, downplaying the risks of addiction. 182
Drug distributors—who distribute and track medications from warehouses to
healthcare providers—also played a heavy role in the opioid crisis. 183 Distributors
such as Cardinal Health, McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, and Rochester Drug CoOperative have been alleged to have shipped oxycodone to pharmacies despite
knowing that the prescriptions were suspicious.184 Despite being legally required to
monitor suspicious opioid orders, the three largest distributors are alleged to not have
had any meaningful programs in place for the first decade of the opioid crisis.185
B. Legal Strategies for Holding Pharmaceutical Companies Responsible
To date, there have been numerous legal battles designed to hold Purdue Pharma
and other opioid companies accountable for their role in the opioid crisis. Many of
these battles remain ongoing. Because of their potential to gain monetary funds for
opioid treatment, their insight into the roots of the opioid crisis, and the control they
offer the federal government over opioid manufacturers and distributors, these
options are more productive than criminal charges levied against individual
physicians.
1. Federal Multidistrict Litigation
Over 1500 cases brought on behalf of cities, counties, tribes, hospitals, thirdparty payers, and individuals against roughly thirty defendants—including opioid
manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma and Cardinal Health and retailers like CVS—
were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and assigned to
Judge Dan Aaron Polster of the Northern District of Ohio in January of 2018.
Initially, Judge Polster stated that he hoped to see the cases settled within a year,
declaring that “[w]e don’t need briefs and we don’t need trials.” 186 However, Judge
181
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Polster later changed course, and a bellwether trial for three consolidated lawsuits
was set to take place in October of 2019.187 Hours before opening arguments were
scheduled to begin, however, the two Ohio counties and four drug companies set to
battle in that trial announced that they had reached a $260-million settlement.188 The
settlement is likely to play a major role in determining the resolution of the many
remaining lawsuits and may lay the groundwork for a global settlement. 189
2. State Attorney General Lawsuits
The multidistrict litigation is only one aspect of the legal troubles facing opioid
manufacturers and distributors. Attorneys general in many states have chosen to file
their own independent lawsuits rather than join the consolidated cases pending in
Ohio, and in total there are over three-hundred pending opioid-related cases in state
courts.190 On March 26, 2019, the State of Oklahoma reached a $270-million
settlement with Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family in a lawsuit over their role in
the opioid crisis.191 In Massachusetts, the Attorney General filed a similar lawsuit
against Purdue and the Sacklers, alleging that the company continued to market
OxyContin aggressively despite knowing of rising overdose deaths.192 Purdue and
the Sacklers are not the only defendants in state lawsuits, which target a wide range
of manufacturers, distributors, and individuals. 193
3. Federal Criminal Charges
Until recently, the Justice Department has focused on criminal investigations of
physicians, online drug networks, and illicit foreign opioid manufacturers, rather
than on the manufacturers and distributors in the U.S. that created the opioid crisis.194
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In 2007, after a four-year investigation by the Justice Department discovered
evidence that “Purdue Pharma knew about ‘significant’ abuse of OxyContin in the
first years after the drug’s introduction in 1996 and concealed that information,”
federal prosecutors recommended felony indictments for three Purdue Pharma top
executives on charges including conspiracy to defraud the United States.195
However, top Justice Department officials instead reached a settlement with Purdue
and its executives in which the company paid approximately $600 million in fines
and three of its top executives pleaded guilty to criminal “misbranding” violations
and agreed to pay thirty-four million dollars in fines.196
Since the 2007 settlement, there have been few federal cases against opioid
manufacturers or distributors. However, the tide appears to be shifting, as federal
prosecutors appear to be increasing their efforts against drug manufacturers and
distributors. In May 2019, five executives of Insys Therapuetics, Inc. were convicted
of federal racketeering charges by a Boston federal jury.197 The United States
Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts successfully alleged that founder
and former Chief Executive Officer John Kapoor bribed doctors to prescribe high
doses of Subsys—an opioid that is one hundred times stronger than morphine and
highly addictive—to patients who did not need it.198 Insys then had employees call
insurance companies while pretending to be from doctors’ offices, fabricating
diagnoses in order to get coverage for the Subsys prescriptions.199 At trial, jurors
were shown internal spreadsheets that Insys made to track the amount of money it
paid to each doctor and the amount the company made from each doctor’s
prescriptions.200
Moreover, on April 23, 2019, the Justice Department announced that the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York had brought federal
criminal charges against Rochester Drug Co-Operative (“RDC”), which is one of the
ten largest drug distributors in the country, as well as two of the RDC’s former
officers.201 The charges included unlawful distribution of oxycodone and fentanyl
as well as conspiracy to defraud the DEA, and the Government also brought a civil
195
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suit against RDC for their failure to report suspicious controlled substance orders to
the DEA.202
Although the charges levied against RDC were severe, the Government also
announced that it had reached an agreement with RDC “under which RDC agreed to
accept responsibility for its conduct by making admissions and stipulating to the
accuracy of an extensive Statement of Facts, pay a 20 million dollar penalty, reform
and enhance its Controlled Substances Act compliance program, and submit to
supervision by an independent monitor.”203 The government agreed that if RDC
remained in compliance with the agreement, it would defer prosecution for five years
and then dismiss the charges.204
The two former RDC officials, William Pietruszewski and Laurence F. Doud
III, were charged with illegal narcotics distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. section
841(a)(1), as well as conspiracy to defraud the United States. 205 Mr. Pietruszewski
was also charged with failure to file suspicious order reports with the DEA. 206 The
charges against Mr. Doud remain pending, while Mr. Pietruszewski pled guilty to
the charges against him, pursuant to a cooperation agreement.207
C. Why, Despite Their Limits, These Options Offer Greater Benefits than
Prosecuting Individual Physicians
Litigation against drug manufacturers and distributors, alone, will not solve
America’s opioid epidemic. However, particularly in contrast with prosecuting
doctors, there are far greater benefits to pursuing both civil and criminal litigation
against drug manufacturers and distributors than against individual physicians.
Litigation against drug companies has the potential to bring about large-scale change
in the current treatment of opioid users and in the future of drug approval, marketing,
and regulation.
The first and most obvious benefit of going after drug companies is money. In
many of the cases noted above, pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors have
reached massive settlements with both state governments and the federal
government. For instance, in Oklahoma, over $100 million of the state’s $270
million settlement with Purdue is earmarked for a new addiction treatment and
research center at Oklahoma State University in Tulsa. 208 Opioid litigation has the
potential to be on par with the Big Tobacco litigation of the 1990s, which resulted in
the largest civil litigation settlement agreement in U.S. history. 209 While plaintiffs
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involved in litigation against opioid manufacturers face the additional legal burden
of proving that the drugs, which were FDA approved, were used as directed and still
caused harm, they also have the benefit of decades of improvement in health records
and pharmacy records, as well as the precedent set by the Big Tobacco litigation.210
Like the Master Settlement Agreement reached by the states and the Big Tobacco
companies, and like the settlement agreement reached in Oklahoma, litigation
against pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors could ultimately result in
those companies footing the bill for large-scale opioid addiction cessation treatment,
research, and awareness.211
Criminal and civil litigation against pharmaceutical companies also give the
public far greater insight into the root causes of the opioid epidemic. Barry Meier,
who has covered the opioid epidemic for the New York Times for seventeen years,
noted that a downside to settling cases with opioid companies is that lawsuits are
often ended quickly, before discovery has a chance to truly develop, and that even
when information regarding companies’ knowledge of the addictive nature of
opioids is discovered, it is often subject to confidentiality agreements reached as part
of the settlements.212 If cases against opioid companies go to trial, however,
important information about the history of the opioid epidemic could be revealed,
which could impact the future of how governments approve and regulate drugs, as
well as how companies test, market, and sell them. 213
Civil and criminal actions against pharmaceutical companies by the government
can also allow for greater government control over specific companies that have
acted wrongly. While the federal government already has extensive regulatory
control over drug companies, agreements between the government and drug
companies that come about as a result of lawsuits can bring bad actor companies
under even greater scrutiny. For instance, the recently deferred prosecution
agreement between the government and Rochester Drug Co-Operative, requiring
reform and expansion of the company’s Controlled Substances Act compliance
program and independent supervision, is just one example of how prosecuting drug
companies can give the federal government tighter control over companies that are
known to have harmed the public with addictive and dangerous drugs.
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CONCLUSION
America’s opioid epidemic is complex and challenging, and it will not be
overcome by any one policy or strategy. Experts recommend a number of
intertwined strategies to combat this disease of despair, including stricter prescribing
measures; expansion of alternative treatment for current sufferers of chronic pain
who rely on opioids; expanded addiction treatment; needle exchange programs and
supervised injection sites; increased access to naloxone; and, perhaps most
fundamentally, changes to the way communities address physical, emotional,
economic, and social well-being.214 Litigation in any form can only look backward
in an attempt to hold wrongful parties responsible and gain knowledge from past
missteps.
The prosecution of physicians is simply one small piece of the complicated
puzzle that is the opioid crisis. It may seem that clarifying the means by which
doctors are prosecuted is an academic exercise in the face of a real and critical
epidemic. However, the circuit split on the elements required to be alleged in
indictments against doctors, as well as the larger issues with defining the without a
legitimate medical purpose element, have real ramifications not only on physicians,
but on communities who depend on doctors for needed healthcare. Congress and the
courts should take care to clarify and redefine the type of conduct that rises to
criminality among physicians, who often struggle to walk the line between providing
compassionate medical care and overprescribing dangerous drugs. Moreover, state
and federal governments who seek to hold people and entities responsible for the
opioid crisis should look beyond individual medical practitioners, and instead focus
on the drug companies and their executives whose direct and knowledgeable actions
brought this epidemic into being. Holding the proper parties responsible for the
opioid crisis is one of many steps the government can take in helping the nation to
heal.
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